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FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES
By MARJORIE JEAN BONNEY*
N THE fall of 1916 the people of the United States were con-
fronted for the first time with the prospect of a nation-wide
strike which threatened to tie up the transportation system of the
country. Following a period of national anxiety, during which
plan after plan for the peaceful settlement of the dispute was seen
to fail, Congress passed the Adamson act which granted the de-
mands of the threatening unions and averted the strike. The fall
and winter of 1919 witnessed one of the most disastrous coal
strikes that has ever occurred in the mine fields. In October,
1921, a nation-wide strike was again threatened by the trans-
portation brotherhoods and averted only narrowly. A second dis-
astrous mine strike of national import, which involved both the
anthracite and the bituminous fields, closed the chief coal mines
of the country from April of last year until September. And
following close on the heels of the mine strike-came the shopmen's
strike which is. still unsettled on 135 railroads. The increasing fre-
quency of threats of national railroad strikes; the general dis-
comfort and inconvenience caused the public by the strikes of
individual railroad crafts, and the realization of the national
suffering which results from a nation-wide coal strike, make the
question of the power of the federal government to intervene and
prevent strikes of such a disastrous nature, one of vital im-
portance.
It is therefore, the purpose of this paper, first to present the
extent to which the federal government has already developed
its powers of intervention, and second, to investigate what further
measures it can adopt to ,insure the nation against the strike
danger.
I
THE ARBITRATION AcT OF 1888, THE ERDMAN ACT, AND THE
NEWLAiNDS AcT
The survey of the development of federal intervention in
railway labor disputes will entail a study of the policy of the gov-
ernment toward this type of dispute from 1877 when it first
took cognizance of the strike danger, through 1888, 1898 and 1913
*Pontiac, Ill., special agent of the Federal Children's Bureau.
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when the corporation was more feared than the labor union, up-to
1916 and 1920 after it was realized that a definite shift of power
from capital to labor had taken place. The policy of the govern-
ment in these years is exemplified, with the exception of 1877,
in federal acts dealing with the railroad strike problem.
At the outset of such a study it is important to note that there
was no national labor problem calling for federal intervention
before 1877. The question arises, why did this not become earlier
a national problem? And the answer is found, first, in the lack
of a permanent, self-conscious laboring class, and secondly in
the lack of stable national organizations giving to members of
this class unity of aim and action." Not until there is a self-
conscious, wage-earning class definitely united into national or-
ganizations can there be a permanent national labor problem; a
problem which calls not for intermittent federal cognizance, but
for a permanent constructive policy.
We find that the labor problem does not become iiational with
the railroad strikes of 1877. The approach of the national status
of the problem is merely foreshadowed by the disturbances of
this year. The rail strikes of 1877 may be said to mark an inter-
mediary stage in the development of the labor question from a
local to a national problem. For the first time in the history of
the country the effects of a labor strike were seriously felt over
more than one state; for the first time agencies of the federal
government had been interfered with, and for the first time fed-
eral troops were called out to suppress a labor strike. the strike,
however, did not have back of it a national organization, nor was
it yet recognized as presenting a permanent national problem.
The president intervened, not because he saw in the labor upris-
ings a national problem with which the federal government was
obliged to deal,- but because he was requested by the states as
'For an analysis of the growth and history of the labor movement
see Commons, History of Labor in the United States, Vols. I and II. Vol. I
traces the development of the labor movement' from the colonial p~eriod up
to the period, of nationalization in 1860. Vol. II carries on the history
from 1860 to 1918. These volumes deal with "the background which ex-
plains structure, policies, results and problems."2These strikes started on the Baltimore & Ohio road at Martinsburg,
W. Va., and spread rapidly over fourteen states. A description of these
strikes is given in MiNeill's The Labor Movement of Today.. Good
accounts are also given in the magazines of this period. An article by
Thomas A. Scott in the North American, September, 1877, The Recent
Strikes, contains a good description of the 1877 disturbances.
sContrast the action of President Hayes in dealing/with the rail
strikes of 1877 with the action taken by President Cleveland in the Pull-
man strike of 1894. Infra, p. 472.
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES 469
provided in the constitution, to suppress domestic violence. Nor
were the people aware that a permanent labor problem had arisen.
They did not regard the organized strike as a menace; they
feared, rather, unorganized rioting which involved widespread
destruction of property. It was the duty of the government to
protect property against violence that was here stressed rather
than its duty to aid in the amicable settlement of disputes. The
Nation, editorially, expressed this attitude when it said, "Society
does not owe any particular rate of wages to anybody. It owes
protection of life and property and personal rights to its mem-
bers and nothing more."' The proposals of the time urged,
therefore, better means of protecting property from violence and
better organization of federal and state military forces. It was
the cities that listened to these proposals, and the chief effect of
the rail strikes of 1877 was a strengthening of the local militia.5
If the railroad strikes of 1877 foreshadowed the approach of
a permanent labor problem, the great southwestern strike of
18868 announced its arrival. For in this strike, which was the
first organized railroad dispute of serious import, was clearly
demonstrated the dangerous possibilities 'of repeated clashes of
interest between organized railroad labor and arrogant railroad
companies. Congress at last recognized the problem as one which
could not be settled by federal troops and state militias, and there-
fore began to consider what action it could take to avert similar
disturbances. The result was that in 1888 Congress passed a
voluntary arbitration act 7 and thus inaugurated the federal policy
of dealing with the railroad labor problem through voluntary
boards.
425 Nation 85.
'25 Nation, 85, "The inefficiency of the militia showed the need of a
reliable basis of operation for the troops, and the construction of numerous
and strong armories in the large cities dates from 1877." 2 Commons,
op. cit. 191.(This strike was on the Jay Gould lines, and was spoken of as "The
greatest and most memorable railroad strike in the United States." It was
called by the Knights of Labor March 1, became general on March 8 and
dragged on until May 4, when it was officially called off. A detailed account
of the strike is contained in the report, "The Great Strike of 1886," which
was made by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Inspection of Missouri
in 1887.
7Three bills were nresented to the house and one to the senate between
March 22 and March 31, 1886, and one providing for voluntary arbitration
was passed by both houses of the 49th Congress, but failed to receive
President Cleveland's signature because it lacked a provision giving
initiatory powers to the government. Cleveland outlined the type of arbi-
tration he favored in his message of April 22, 1886. Cong. Rec., 40th Con-
gress, first session, April 22.
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The arbitration act of 18888 was broad in its scope, applying
to all controversies between interstate transportation companies
and their employees. 9 It. invested the arbitrators" with the power
to subpoena witnesses and require the production of papers,:1
but it gave them no power to enforce the awards which they were
authorized to make. The act provided, merely, that the decision
of the arbitrators be publicly announced and then filed with the
United States commissioner of labor-.2 The fear of contravening
public opinion would be, the legislators thought, sufficiently strong
to induce both sides to abide by the award."
Ostensibly this act was highly favorable to labor; for labor,
whose bargaining power was, in 1888, materially weaker than
that of capital, was then strongly in favor of arbitration while
capital, on the other hand, as strongly opposed it.. These two atti-
tudes were demonstrated in the southwestern strike, for in this
dispute the unions had made repeated appeals for arbitration, and
the companies bad as repeatedly refused it.'1 It would seem,
therefore, that any act providing for arbitration would be to
labor's advantage. -Actually, however, labor gained very little.
For the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration under the act
was practically foredoomed to failure, by the condition included
in the act, that boards could be established only after both sides
had agreed to the proposal to arbitrate.'5 The attitude taken by
the roads in 1886 was proof of the unlikelihood that this dual
acceptance would ever be secured. The congressmen were aware
825 Stat. at L. 501-04.
925 Stat. at L. 501, sec. 1.
'
0The arbitrators provided for by the act were three in number. One
was to be chosen by the employees, one by the railroads, and the third by
these two. No provision was made for the choice of the third arbitrator
in case the other two failed to agree. See Erdman act footnote 33.
125 Stat. at L. 502, sec. 2.
1225 Stat. at L. 502, sec. 3.
"SNote statement of Representative Osborne: "There is one tribunal
before which the highest in the land will bow in humble submission, and
that is the tribunal of public sentiment. No man, no body of men can
any more withstand the breath of public sentiment than they can blow
away with a breath the mist that comes up from the Ocean." Debate on
Act of 1888, 49th Congress, first session. Cong. Rec. p. 3021.
'
4Report, "The Great Strike of 1886." It is also interesting to note
here that labor was at this time petitioning federal and state legislatures
to pass arbitration measures. Note resolution from a local assembly of
Knights of Labor read by Rep. Glover in Congress in 1886: "We call
upon our legislatures . . .to enact such measures as will compel the recog-
nition of labor organizations and compel corporations to arbitrate differ-
ences between themselves and their employees." Cong. Rec. 49th Congress,
first session, p. 2973:
15Arbitration boards could be established only by the joint, voluntary
action of the two parties. See footnote 10.
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of this inherent weakness in the bill, but were not yet prepared
to bring any form of compulsion to bear on the railroad com-
panies.1 6
"If this measure fails," said Representative O'Neill, however,
"with the strong arm of the government we must take these giant
corporations by the throat and tell them they must yield to arbi-
tration; they must submit to some peaceful means of settlement."'"
At first glance, therefore, the, arbitration act of 1888 appears
to be an entirely futile measure. The act contained one clause,
however, which might have redeemed it from ineffectiveness had
the government not been hesitant in employing it. This was the
clause providing for the creation of a temporary body of three
commissioners 8 authorized to investigate labor disputes upon the
motion of the president, or upon the application either of the
parties to the controversy or of the executive of the state in
which the dispute occurred.' 9 Interest attaches to this provision
for it marks the only appearance of compulsory investigation"0 iAi
federal arbitration acts until 1920.
For six years this act remained inactive on the statute books.
And in 1894 when the first attempt to utilize it was made, it
entirely collapsed. In this year the Pullman strike occurred.
2
'
Arbitration proved impossible under the act of 1888 since George
Pullman against whom the strike was called, insisted that he had
nothing to arbitrate; and the compulsory investigation clause ac-
complished nothing because it was not called into operation until
a month after the strike began, and the commission did not report
until after it was ended. 22 The report of the commission and its
16"I know," said Representative O'Neill, in presenting the arbitration
bill in the 49th Congress, "that the workmen are willing to arbitrate, (in
the strike of 1886) and I know that the president of that vast corporation,
(the Gould line), has not yet consented to do it.... We feel, however,"
he continued, "that all we can do at this time is to invoke the public opinion
of the country in the existing dispute ... to compel the parties on both
sides to appeal to reason." Cong. Rec., 49th Congress, first session, p. 2960.
17 Cong. Rec.. 49th Congress, first session, p. 2959.
'
8The president was authorized to appoint two of the commissioners,
one of whom was to be a resident of the state in which the controversy
occurred. The commissioner of labor was designated to serve as the
third commissioner. 25 Stat. at L. 503, see. 6.
1925 Stat. at L. 503, sec. 6.2 0Compulsory investigation is not here used in the technical sense.
There was no provision in the act of 1888 requiring the maintenance of
the status quo pending the investigation.2
'The best account of the action taken by the government in the Pull-
man strike is contained in Ex-President Cleveland's Presidential Prob-
lems. Chapt. II, The Government and the Chicago Strike.
-
2The report of the commission is contained in Senate Document, 53rd
Congress, third session, Serial 3276.
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recommendations were, however, of aid in drawing up the next
arbitration act.
The federal government, deprived of the assistance of the
arbitration act, was obliged to look about for other means of
bringing to an end the strike, which was seriously obstructing the
mails. Its first action was to issue warrants under the criminal
statutes23 against persons who had participated in the obstruction.
Finding this action ineffective, Attorney-General Olney author-
ized the district attorney of the northern district of Illinois to
secure the issuance of a sweeping injunction against Eugene Debs,
president of the American Railway Union, other officers of the
Union, and those persons participating in the obstructions34 The
injunction, issued July 3, was read to a mob of between two and
three thousand strikers and was met by jeers, howls and further
obstruction. President Cleveland immediately ordered troops to
Chicago, and the federal government followed up this action July
10 by arresting Debs and the other officers on criminal indict-
ments. These officers of the American Railway Union were
arrested a second time July 17 for disobeying the injunction of
July 3, and the strike was practically broken. The federal troops
were recalled July 20.
The federal action taken in 1894 differs from that taken in
1877.25 President Cleveland sent the federal troops to the strike
scene, not to quell domestic violence, as did President Hayes, but
to protect the United States mails and interstate commerce and to
enforce the orders of the federal courts. He sent troops not
only without the request of Governor Altgelt, but actually over
his protest. The president based his right to do this on sections
5298 and 5299 of the revised statutes. The former provided that
it should be lawful for the president, when the laws of the United
States, because of illegal obstructions, became unenforceable by
ordinary judicial proceedings, to employ land or naval forces to
execute laws; and the latter provided that it was the duty of the
president "when obstructions . . . existed in a state and state
authorities were unable, or failed or refused to protect the rights
of the people," to employ the land or naval forces, or to use
23Revised statutes, sec. 3995, provides a fine not to exceed $100 for
persons who knowingly or willfully obstruct the mails.24Attorpey-General Olney "suggested" to special counsel that it
might be well to apply to the courts for an injunction instead of relying
wholly on the criminal statutes. He relied on the commerce clause and the
Sherman Anti-Trust act for this action. Cleveland Presidential Prob-
lems.25See supra, p 468.
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"any other means necessary" for the suppression of domestic
violence. Such obstructions clearly occurred, and hence, tinder
the provisions of these statutes, it was not only legal for President
Cleveland to call out the troops, but his dtgty as well.
The use made of the injunction in thle Chicago strike calls
for special comment since the case of In re Debs,2" which arose
out of the arrest of the president of the American Railway Union'
on a charge of contempt, established conclusively the right of the
federal government to intervene with the injunction to prevent
conspiracies 27 which interfered with interstate commerce or the
mails. The lower federal court2-s based the power to issue the
injunction solely on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, but the Supreme
Court, in reviewing the case, rested it on the broader ground that
the federal government had full power over interstate commerce
and the mails, and in the exercise of this power could "remove
everything put upon the highways, natural or artificial, to ob-
struct the passage of interstate commerce or the mails.
29
By 1894, therefore, the federal government had established
its right to intervene unsolicited in labor disturbances interfering
with interstate commerce'or the mails by one of three methods.
It could institute investigations; it could call out the federal troops,
or it could issue injunctions. None of these methods were, how-
ever, wholly satisfactory. Investigations had proved useless in
the recent strikes; federal troops could not be called out before
the dispute was actually in progress, and the injunction did not
prove effective when directed against large numbers of strikers.2
It is not surprising, therefore, that at the conclusion of the strike
of 1894 Congress turned its attention 'to strengthening the pro-
visions of the Arbitration Act of 1888.
The result was the Erdman Act, which became law June 1,
1898."' This act, not exceptionally strong itself, is superior to
the act of 1888 which it repealed. It took a long step forward
by providing for mediation and conciliation which was to precede
26(1895) 158 U.S. 564, 39 L.Ed. 1092, 15 S.C.R. 900.
2TThe Pullman strike, it should be noted, was a sympathetic strike.28tTnited States v. Debs, (1894) 64 Fed. 724.29For full discussion of the injunction see infra, Chapter II.
•
0Another weakness in the power of the injunction over strikes was
that the injunction could not restrain strikes the purpose of which was the
betterment of conditions of employment. This phase did not enter into
the case of In re Debs, however, because the Pullman strike was a sym-
pathetic strike. This phase of the equity power is discussed il Chapter
II, infra.
3130 Stat. at L. 424-28.
/
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arbitration wherever possible. The chairman of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the commissioner of labor were
named by tha act as mediators and were authorized, on the appli-
cation of either party, to get in touch with the other party and
to attempt an.amicable settlement of the dispute.3 - This pro-
vision, which was destined to become the most important provision
of the act, was considered very lightly by the legislators, who
devoted the burden of their discussions to the arbitration proceed-
ings.
. Arbitration proceedings under the Erdman Act, like proceed-
ings under the earlier act, cotild not be instituted until both sides
had agreed to arbitrate.13 " After arbitration had been agreed to,
however, the provisions bf the •1898 act were more stringent.
Under this act the parties in agreeing to arbitrate were obliged
also to agree not to strike or lock out pending the award and to
abide by the terms of the award for one year. 4 It was made
unlawful, for three months after the award, for an employer to
discharge a workman, or for a workman to quit his employment
without giving thirty days' written notice."5 And finally, the
award was made enforceable in equity.36 An important proviso
prohibited the issuance of the injunction to compel the per-
formance of personal service.3 7  This proviso makes it evident
that the teeth in the act were intended for the corporations.
The Erdman Act, however, possessed weak points. In the
first place its scope was limited to disputes affecting employees
who were engaged in train operation.3 8 In the second place neither
mediation nor arbitration proceedings could be instituted with-
out the cofperation of both sides; the mediators were given no
power to intervene on their own initiative nor could either party
be compelled to request mediation; and in no case could an arbi-
tration board be established without the co6peration of employers
230 Stat. at L. 425, see. 2.
33Arbitrators were named under this act in the same manner as they
were under the act of 1888. See supra, footnote 10. It was provided,
however, that in case the two arbitrators chosen by the two parties failed
to agree on a third arbitrator after five days, the commissioner of labor
should then name the third arbitrator.34David A. McCabe, Federal Intervention in Labor Disputes under the
Erdman, Newlands and Adamson Acts, 7 Pro. Acad. Pol. Sci. 94.
3530 Stat. at L. 427, sec 7.36Appeals were permitted under the act, first to the U. S. circuit court,
then to the circuit court of appeals, where the decision was final. 30 Stat. at
L. 426. sec. 4.
3730 Stat. at L. 425, sec. 3.38This left outside of the jurisdiction of the act shop-men. car-workers,
freight handlers, clerks, etc. 30 Stat. at L. 424, sec. 1.
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as well as of the employees. "The employer," said Commissioner
of Labor Neill in 1912, "is as free to resort to a lockout and the
employees to inaugurate a strike as if the Erdman Act had never
been passed."3"  It is important to note also that the compulsory
investigation clause of the act of 1888 was left out of the Erdman
Act.,"
The Erdman Act was not immediately successful. The first
attempt to utilize its provisions, made a year after its passage,
resulted in a complete failure.41  The railroads in repudiating
arbitration in this year, refused to "abdicate" their "vital pre-
rogative" of determining wages "to a special and transient com-
mittee of three arbitrators," and while expressing "highest respect"
for the commissioners, and confidence in their "ability" and
"impartiality," felt that they "ought not, and cannot rightfully,
relinquish their duty to determine that question, (of wages) ." 42
For seven and a half years following this failure no attempt was
made to call into action the clauses of the bill.43
The year 1906 marked the beginning of a period of great
activity under the act. During the ensuing seven years the
mediation and arbitration provisions were invoked in sixty-one
controversies ;44 and during this entire period "there was no
case of a serious strike, or danger of a serious strike on the part
of those employees to whom the law was made applicable, in which
the provisions were not invoked." 43  And, surprising as it may
have been to the authors of the act, it was the mediation clause
which functioned in the majority of these cases. Twenty-eight
cases were settled by mediation, eight by mediation and arbitra-
tion, and only four by arbitration alone.40
The success of the Erdman Act, however, it is important
to note, was not due in the first instance, to its superiority over
the act of 1888, but to a change in the attitude of the railroad
managements toward arbitration. For in 1906 it was not the
391912 Bulletins, Department of Labor, Mediation and Arbitration of
Railroad Disputes in the United States.4
°This clause had functioned just once under the act of 1888. See
supra, p. 471.
411912 Bulletins of Department of Labor section on History of the
First Attempt to Utilize the Erdman Act.
42Ibid.
431912 Bulletins. The antagonistic attitude of the road toward arbitra-
tion in this period explains the disuse of the act in this period.
44Ibid.
45William Chambers, American Experience in Settling Labor Disputes,
7 Acad. Pol. Sci., Pro. 1.
46Ibid.
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employees, disgusted at the failure of arbitration in 1899, but
the company that sought mediation, and it was not until February
27, 1908, after seven other cases had been settled, that labor
requested the intervention of the federal board.
The sudden change in the attitude of the railroads toward
arbitration was a direct result of the extension of the scope of
the labor controversies which followed the adoption, in 1907, by
the brotherhoods, of the policy of concerted movement in present-
ing their demands.- In this year the first concerted movement of
railroad employees was inaugurated by the conductors and train-
men in the western territory, 8 and in 1910-11 similar movements
were engaged in by the firemen in the western territory, by the
conductors and trainmen in the eastern territory, and by the
Brotherhood of Railroad Engineers.4 9  Coincident with the in-
creased strength which labor gained from unified action came
less zeal on the part of the employee, and more zeal on the part
of the employer to submit to arbitration.
As labor controversies extended over wider areas, the feeling
grew that the Erdman Act, enacted in a *period when disputes
were restricted to individual roads, was inadequate to meet the
new conditions. The roads, particularly, expressed a dislike for
submitting demands affecting a vast mileage to boards of three
men, and because of this aversion, refused, in the engineers'
strike of 1911 to seek the intervention of the federal mediators. 50
It was only through the extra-legal action of the federal mediators
who intervened unsolicited and induced the parties to submit their
dispute to a non-governmental board of seven that a serious strike
was averted.51
Instead, however, of taking this narrowly averted strike as a
warning that the act of 1898 needed revision, Congress waited
until a concerted movement by conductors and trainmen, involving
47Report of the Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation for the
years 1913-1919. Joint requests were made 18 times and in one case the
mediators without legal authority, intervened on their own motion.48This controversy involved 38 roads and 42,000 men. The mileage in-
volved was 101,500. Prior to this time the greatest mileage involved had
been 5,800. Ibid., Appendix, Table 3.49An account of these early concerted movements is given in an excel-
lent article, Locomotive Engineers' Arbitration: Its antecedents and its
Outcome, by William J. Cunningham, 27 Q. J. of Econ. 12.50For a brief discussion of the Engineers' Strike of 1911 see article by
Cunninglfam cited, footnote 49.51The results of this arbitration were unsatisfactory to labor. The fact
that this board advocated compulsory arbitration turned labor definitely
against arbitrations under non-governmental boards.
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practically all of the railroads in the eastern territory, threatened
a disastrous strike, and then, at the urgent request of the president,
hurriedly passed the Newlands Act.2 which had been drafted by
the railroad men, employees and members of the National Civic
Association.53 It should be noted that in this controversy the
employees favored arbitration. They refused to arbitrate, how-
ever, under a non-governmental board, and the railroads refused
to arbitrate under the Erdman Act unamended. It should also
be noted that the Erdman Act failed in the 1912 emergency, not
because of any defect in its mediation provisions, but because of
dissatisfaction with the arbitration machinery.
The Newlands Act, passed as an emergency measure to provide
a mode of arbitration acceptable to the roads and the men and
thus avert a strike, has the distinction of being the first federal
act which had the sanction of both labor and capital. It amended
the Erdman Act in two important respects. 4 It provided for the
arbitration board of six contended for by the roads,5 and created
a permanent board of mediation and conciliation of three mem-
bers", which was given the right to intervene on its own motion
"in any case in which an interruption in traffic is imminent and
fraught with serious detriment to the public interest."57  The
creation of this permanent board of mediation, endowed with the
power to offer its services unasked, was a distinct step in the right
direction. Mediation which had been provided for more or less
incidentally by the Erdman Act, had risen to a place of
prominence by 1913, while arbitration, with which the Erdman
5238 Stat. at L., 103-10.53Report of the Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation for 1913-1919.
54Several minor amendments were made. The arbitration machinery
was improved by section 4 which provided that the parties to the arbitra-
tion, in their agreement to arbitrate, themselves fix the duration of the
award, and also specify the period, after the beginning of the hearings,
within which the board should file its award. If this period were not fixed,
the act provided that that award should be filed thirty days after the be-
ginning of the hearings. The Erdman Act had arbitrarily fixed the dura-
tion of the awards at one year, and had made no provision for preventing
long drawn out arbitration proceedings. Another amendment of the New-
lands Act provided that arbitration boards could be reconvened to con-
strue awards.
55Despite the fact that the railroads insisted on six-member arbitration
hoards, it is interesting to note that the boards of six members have been
used only in one-third of the cases under the Newlands Act, and the
greatest difficulties over awards have arisen over awards of six-member
boards. Report of Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation, 1913-1919.
5638 Stat. at L. 105, sec. 11.
r738 Stat. at L. 104, sec. 2.
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Act had been chiefly concerned, had been little used. When
Congress, then, in the Newlands Act placed the greater emphasis
upon mediation, it was applying the lesson it had learned from
seven years' experience in dealing with labor disputes. Of the
total number of cases settled under the Newlands Act, 70 were
successfully adjusted by mediation. In only 21 cases was it found
necessary to resort to arbitration.58
When the Newlands Act failed in 1916 it failed, as did the
Erdman Act, because one of the parties was dissatisfied with the
arbitration machinery. In this year it was the employees who
looked with disfavor on arbitration and refused to submit their
dispute to a government board. When Congress in 1920 drew up
a new act for the settlement of labor disputes it ignored the les-
sons taught- by the Erdman and Newlands Acts. Instead of
'strengthening mediation59 which had functioned successfully in 98
cases, it turned toward arbitration which had twice been responsi-
ble for the breakdown in emergencies of federal labor acts. This
later phase of the problem will be discussed in Chapter III.
II
EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN LABOR DISPUTES
Under the arbitration acts discussed in the foregoing chapter.
the federal government can intervene only in railroad disputes
which involve employees engaged in interstate transportation.
What of its power to intervene in disputes, such as those involved
in mine disputes, which fall outside of this category? We have
already seen that in two contingencies the federal troops mnay be
used. They may be used, first, if the president is requested to
quell domestic violence,60 and secondly if agencies of the federal
government are interfered with.61 This mode of intervention,
however, cannot be called into action until the violence or the
interference has become an actuality. Three other methods are
at the command of the federal government. These are the in-
5 SReport of the Commissioner of Mediation and Conciliation for 1913-
1919.
59Mediation needed the assistance of compulsory investigation to give
it increased effectiveness. William McCabe said of the Newlands Act,
"The law failed to provide the logical initial supplement to voluntary
mediation and arbitration . . . the appointment of a commission of investi-
gation and recommendation when mediation and arbitration have failed."
Federal Interventioh in Labor Disputes Under the Erdman, Newlands and
Adamson Act. 7 Pro. Acad. Pol Sci. 94.6 0See strikes of 1877, p. 468. This method was used by President Hard-
ing in the West Virginia mine strikes of 1921.
G1See Pullman strike of 1894. p. 472.
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junction, personal intervention by the president, and intervention
by the division of conciliation of the Department of Labor. The
federal government can employ, within limited fields, any one, or
all three of these modes of intervention in dealing with either
railroad or mine disputes. We will consider briefly the respective
.effectiveness of these three methods.
The Use of the Injunction in Labor Disputes: The right
of the federal government to issue injunctions in labor disputes
is based, first on !he control which Congress enjoys over
interstate commerce and the mails. This control was held in
In Re Debs 2 to grant to Congress the right to "remove every-.
thing put upon the highways, natural or artificial, to- obstruct
the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying of the mails."
This case held further that the courts could invoke the injunction
to restrain such obstruction, asserting that "the right of the
courts to interfere in such matters is recognized from ancient
times and indubitable authority." The right to issue injunctions
is based, secondly, on a group of statutes which either actually
or impliedly give the federal courts equity jurisdiction. These
are the Interstate Commerce Act which, makes illegal combina-
tions which deny equal facilities in the transfer of interstate
commerce between connecting lines ;63 the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act which condemns "every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or commerce" and
provides for the use of the injunction as a preventive remedy,
and the Clayton Act which defines the limits within which the
injunction may be used in labor disputes. 4
The equity jurisdiction bestowed upon the courts by these
acts has been subject to the limitation that injunctions will not
issue in strikes which have as their sole object the improvement
of working conditions. This rule which has been laid down by
a long line of decisions, 5 is based on the theory that equity will
not compel the performance of personal service. All of the
62(1894) 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. Ed. 1092. 15 S.C.R. 900.
6324 Stat. at L. 380, 383, secs. 3 and 12.
4Two other statutes, one providing a penalty for all conspiracies
against the United States, (Revised Statutes, Sec. 5440), and the other
making interference with the mails criminal, (Revised Statutes, Sec.
3995), provide grounds for the issuance of injunctions when their viola-
tion is accompanied by irreparable injury to property. Note statement
made bv judge Taft in In Re Charge to the Grand jury, (1894) 62 Fed.
828: "When an irreparable and continuing injury is threatened to private
property equity will generaly enjoin on behalf of the persons whose rights
are to be invaded even though an indictment in behalf of the public will
also lie."
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cases establishing this principle, however, draw a distinction
between requiring continuance of service and requiring the dis-
continuance of illegal acts.6 6 Arthur v. Oakes, the first federal
case clearly to announce this principle recognized as unlawful any
combination "which has for its object to cripple the property .. .
and to embarrass the operation of the railroads . . .,,67 This
distinction has been observed in later cases.68 It may be said by
the way of summary, then first, that as the- law now stands, in-
junctions will not issue against a combination, the object of which
is lawful; secondly, that if, in the course of a lawful strike
violence or intimidation are used these unlawful acts will be
enjoined,69 and thirdly, that injunctions will issue where the
combination has for its object the destruction of property, em-
barrassment of operation of business, or coercion of innocit"
third parties, or other unlawful purposes. The secondary boycott
comes under this category.
70
The Clayton Anti-Trust Act which was at first believed to
limit the federal power of injunction, has really donerno more
6 5Arthur v. Oakes, (1894) 63 Fed. 310, 11 C.C.A. 209, 25 L.R.A. 414,
Toledo A.A.&N.M. v. Penn. Co., (1893) 54 Fed. 730, United States v.
Elliott, (1894) 64 Fed. 27 and Wabash v. Hannahan, (1903) 121 Fed. 562.
G6 United States v. Elliott, (1894) 64 Fed. 27 calls attention to this
distinction, and Morton Poe Fisher in a thesis on "Grounds for the Is-
suance of Injunctions by the United States Courts In Trade Disputes Be-
tween Employers and Employees," published in the Baltimore Daily Record,
June 10-11, 1920, emphasizes this point strongly.67The "embarrassment" which a peaceful strike would occasion, is not
here meant for the court specifies embarrassment "either by disabling or
rendering unfit for use property . . . or actually obstructing their control
or management of the property by using force, intimidation or threats or
other wrongful methods against the receivers or their agents or against
the employees remaining in their service, or by'using like methods to cause
employees to quit or prevent or deter others from entering into the place of
those leaving it."
6sUnited States v. Elliott, (1894) 64 Fed.'27, Wabash v. Hannahan,
(1903) 121 Fed. 562, and others.69Picketing comes under this category. Earlier cases held that picket-
ing was illegal and enjoinable when it went beyond the bounds of peaceful
persuasion and amounted to intimidation. Goldfield Consolidated Mines
Co. v. Goldfield Miners Union, (1908) 159 Fed. 500. Chief Justice Taft,
however, in a recent decision, Truax et al. v. Corrigan, (1921) 258 U.S.
312, 42 S.C.R. 124, practically held in dicta that picketing which involves
more than one picket per entrance is illegal. He held that "peaceful picket-
ing was a contradiction in terms," but stated that "subject to the primary
right of the employer and his employees and would-be employees to free
access to his premises without obstruction by violence, intimidation, an-
noyance, importunity or dogging, it was lawful for ex-employees on a strike
and their fellows in a labor union to have a single representative at each
entrance to the plant of the employer to announce the strike and peace-
ably persuade the employees and would-be employees to join them in it."
7OThe whole problem of the boycott, primary and secondary, is dis-
cussed in great detail in Laidler, Boycotts and the Labor Struggle, passim.
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than "codify" the rules already laid down in court decisions.
Section 6, which definitely legalizes labor organizations and their
legitimate activities, is merely a restatement of the principle laid
down in Arthur v. Oakes, and section 20 does no more than place
beyond the reach of the injunction those activities of labor organ-
izations which court decisions have already recognized as legal.7 ,
Even the hope of labor that the Clayton Act legalized the second-
ary boycott was shattered by the Supreme Court in the Duplex
Printing Case.7 2 The act has, in short, not materially changed
the legal position of labor.
In spite of the protections which the courts have placed about
the use of the injunction, the federal equity power extends
materially the field in which the government can intervene in
labor disputes. This is true because it is not limited to disputes
involving men in a particular industry as it is by the arbitration
acts, but can reach out to any threatened interference with a
federal agency, such as the mails, or an interest under federal
protection such as interstate commerce. 3 Mine strikes which
involve illegal acts in restraint of interstate transportation of coal
are brought within the cognizance of the federal government by
the injunction.
The value of the injunction as a preventive remedy depends
in the last analysis, however, not so much upon the scope of its
field as upon its effectiveness and upon its justice. For such a
7lThis clause, laying down the important limit that the dispute must
be, between employers and employees or between employe., or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, states flat if the dis-
pute is concerning terms or conditions of employment and does not give
rise to irreparable injury, lind injunctions will not restrain such actions as
terminating relation of employment, recommending or advising others
so to do, or from ceasing to patronize or from recommending others so
to do. i7 2Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, (1921) 254 U.S. 443, 65 L. Ed. 349,
41 S.C.R. 172, 16 A.L.R. 196. The court in this case decided that the lim-
iting clause that the dispute must be between employers and., employees,
etc., (ibid), acted to place the secondary boycott which is not between em-
ployers and their employees directly outside of the acts legalized by the
Clayton Act. The dissenting opinion held that the terms employers and
employees meant employing and working classes in general and did not
refer to the individual employer and his employees.
73Note Lowe v. Lawlor, (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 53 L. Ed. 488, 28 S.C.R.
301 on the extent of the government's power to intervene in labor disputes
through the equity power: "A combination may be in restraint of trade
and within the meaning of the anti-trust act although the persons exer-
cising the restraint may not themselves be engaged in interstate trade and
some of the means employed may be acts within a state and individually
beyond the scope of federal authority . . . but the acts must be consid-
ered as a whole and if the purposes are to prevent interstate transportation
the plan is open to condeinnation under the anti-trust act."
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strike as the railroad strike which was threatened in 1916, which
has as its only object higher wages and shorter hours, comes,
under the existing rules of law, in the category of lawful strike.7 4
It is likewise an inadequate remedy for the mine strike free
from violence and unlawful picketing. It can prevent the illegal
acts which accompany railroad or mine strikes, but it cannot force
striking railroad or mine employees, who are utilizing in a peace-
ful manner their recognized right to withdraw their services in
an attempt to improve their working conditions, to return to work
against their will.
The injunction, however, becomes a remarkably effective
remedy for even the so-called legal strike when it includes in its
prohibitions acts hitherto considered peaceful, and hence legal,
which are vital to the successful execution of the strike. The
Wilkerson order issued at the height of the recent shop-
men's strike, attempts to restrain several such acts,7_
and if sustained will establish a precedent which will
greatly increase the adequacy of the injunction as a weapon
against the peaceful strike. Its effect will be, in fact, to illegalize
every strike on interstate railroads. It should be noted at this
point that the Wilkerson injunction, if sustained, will extend the
power of the injunction only in-the field of strikes on interstate
railroads. It is based solely on the power of the government to
"remove everything put.upon the highways, natural or artificial,
to obstruct the passage of interstate commerce or the mails," and
7 41t is only a matter of time, however, before court decisions will be
altered to modify the general rule in its application to railroad strikes. An
indication that a different rule will be evolved for railroad strikes is given
in the case of Wilson v. New, (1917) 243 U.S. 332 61 L. Ed. 755, 37 S.C.R.
298, in which Chief Justice White said, in obiter dicta, "Whatever would
be the right of an employee engaged in a private business to demand such
wages as he desired and to leave the employment if he does not get them
and by concert of action to agree with others to leave upon the same condi-
tion, such rights are necessarily subject to limitation when the employ-
ment is accepted in a business charged with a public interest," For full
discussion of this trend see infra, chapt. III. See opinion of Amidon, J.
in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Brosseau, (1923) 286 Fed. 414, with review
of the cases.
75Labor leaders are restrained from -issuing any instructions or public
statements to members of their unions to induce them to do or say any-
thing to cause any railroad employee to leave his work or to cause any
person to leave the employment of the railroad." Officers of the unions
are restrained from "picketing or in any other manner by letters, .circulars,
telephone messages, word of mouth communications or interviews, en-
couraging any person to leave the employ of a railroad or to refrain from
entering such employ." Not only is interference by threats forbidden, but
also interference by "epithets, jeers, taunts or entreaties, striking shopmen
enjoined from entering on railroad property and meetings of unions for
prolonging the conspiracy are forbidden.
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consequently will not alter existing equity law in other fields.
The wording of the injunction itself indicates clearly that the
aim is to restrain only those acts which "int~rfere with, hinder or
obstruct railroad companies in the movement and operation of
passengers and property in interstate commerce or the carriage
of the mails.
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The injunction is becoming increasingly effective in dealing
with unlawful combinations, for the courts are gradually strength-
ening their power to compel obedience to their awards. They can
bring great pressure to bear on recalcitrant unions by enjoining
the officials from the payment of strike benefits; they can enjoin
labor officials from calling illegal strikes.77 Furthermore, in the
Danbury Hatters Case8 they established their power under the
Sherman Act to assess damages against individual workmen guilty
of practices amounting to unlawful restraints of trade. And the
United States Supreme Court further strengthened these broad
powers last June when, in reviewing the Coronado Mine Case,"
it held in dicta that labor unions could be held liable for damages
for illegal strikes which they had encouraged or ratified. 0
This brief summary of the federal equity power leads to the
conclusion that although the injunction is becoming increasingly
effective in the field of illegal.strikes it is, unless strengthened in
the manner discussed above, ineffective in the field of strikes
where the cessation of work is unaccompanied by illegal acts.
It cannot, moreover, meet the ultimate requirement of justice.
In the first place the ordinary law courts are ill-equipped to pass
on the merits of labor cases; and even if they were better equipped
the issues raised in these cases are not usually the fundamental
issues under dispute between labor and capital but the technical
legality of specific and frequently incidental acts. Thus a strike
may be enjoined while the real merits of the controversy between
employer and employee be completely ignored. In leaving this
76Sections (a) and (h)
771n re Charge to Grand Jury, (1894) 62 Fed. 828.
78Lowe v. Lawlor, (1908) 208 U.S. 274, 52 L.Ed. 488, 28 S.C.R. 301.70(1919) 258 Fed. 829, 169 C.C.A. 549, affirmed 42 S.C.R. 587.
s0Dowd v. United Mine Workers of America, (1916) 235 Fed. 1, 148
C.C.A. 495 had previously held that the word "association" in the Sherman
Anti-Trust act included unincorporated associations such as labor organ-
izations and that such organizations could be sued under their names by
persons injured in their business by their action in violation of the pro-
visions of the act. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Co., (1919) 258 Fed. 829, 169 C.C.A. 549, affirmed 42 S.C.R. 587, citing
the above case held that corporations or associations are liable for the
torts of their members if encouraged in the commission of them, or if
ratified thereafter.
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section, therefore, the final conclusion is that the injunction, to be
just, should be used only as a last resort, and after free opportun-
ity has been given for a consideration of the rights of both parties.
Personal Intervention of the President: We come now to a
discussion of the personal intervention of the president as a mode
of federal intervention. It is through the power of the president
to mediate in strikes of national import that federal influence
is brought to bear most effectively on the settlement of mine dis-
putes. His right to act as mediator in labor controversies is purely
extra-legal and rests upon his personal and official influence.8'
Theodore Roosevelt was the first executive to exercise this
power,8 2 and his action in intervening in the anthracite coal strike
of 1902 established a precedent for future presidential action.
The strong and weak points in this method are easily dis-
cernable. Twice in.notable instances personal intervention has
succeeded; twice it has failed miserably. It was successful in the
case of the anthracite coal strike of 190283 in which Roosevelt
offered his services as a mediator and was finally able to persuade
both sides to submit their differences to arbitration. 4 Not only
8]The Outlook of Dec. 9, 1914, says, editorially, of this mode of in-
tervention, "There is nothing in the constitution or laws of the United
States authorizing the president to act in this way; but such action is en-
tirely justifiable on the grounds that there is nothing in the constitution
or laws of the United States forbidding him to do so and there is every
reason why the man who occupies the presidency should employ every
lawful means in great emergencies to exert the influence that the office
gives him as the one representative of the whole people to promote order
and establish justice."8 2Roosevelt acted on what he termed the "Jackson-Lincoln" theory
that "occasionally great national crises arise which call for immediate and
vigorous action and that in such cases . . . the proper attitude for him
to take (the president), is that he is bound to assume that he has the legal
right to do whatever the need of the people demand unless the constitu-
tion or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it." Roosevelt, Autobiography,
p. 504.8 3An account of Roosevelt's action in this strike is given in the ex-
president's autobiography.8 4Had the two sides failed to arbitrate President Roosevelt planned
to induce the governor of Pennsylvania to call on him for aid; he then
planned to send Major-General Sciofield to keep order and prevent inter-
ference with men who wanted to work. He also would instruct General
Schofield to "dispossess the operators and run the mines as a receiver"
until the government investigating commission could make its report and
he himself could issue further orders. (Autobiography) Wilson contem-
plated a similar scheme in the Colorado strike but found it to be illegal.
New York Times, Nov. 25, 1914.
The operators, who objected strenuously to the term "labor representa-
tive," were finally conciliated by President Roosevelt's adroitness in dis-
guising the labor representative, E. E. Clark of the Brotherhood of Rail-
way Conductors, under the imposing title of "eminent sociologist." (Auto-
biography).
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was immediate peace secured by arbitration, but machinery for
the peaceful settlement of disputes was set up and outlived the
term of the award.
Intervention by President Wilson succeeded in 1919 in bring-
ing miners and operators to terths after all other methods had
failed. In the fall of that year a general strike was called by the
United Mine Workers of America. After an unavailing attempt
by the secretary of labor to avert the strike, and after an injunc-
tion directed against the leaders had failed to keep the men from
quitting work, President Wilson intervened and proposed a basis
of settlement which was accepted."8
Presidential intervention failed dismally, however, in the case
of the Colorado mine strike in 1914,86 because of the absolute
refusal of the mine operators to accede to President Wilson's
compromise proposals. The strike dragged on and ended, finally,
'in a defeat for the workmen. Presidential intervention was also
unavailing in the threatened rail strike of 1916.
Presidential intervention again failed last summer in the
settlement of the bituminous and anthracite coal mine strike. It
failed also in the settlement of the shopmen's strike. After the
unsuccessful attempts of President Harding and Secretary of
Labor Davis to bring the striking miners and operators to terms,
the miners and operators themselves, unassisted, settled their dis-
pute. They did not settle it however, until after five months had
elapsed and the country's coal supply had been seriously en-
dangered. Seniority was the snag which prevented presidential
mediation from ending the railroad shopmen's strike.
It is clear from the foregoing that the effectiveness of this
type of intervention lies wholly in the strength of the public
opinion it can call into action; its chief weakness lies in the lack
of any legal power in the president to compel the disputants to
come to terms. It may, however, be regarded as a moderately
effective method of federal intervention considering its purely
informal and extra-legal character.
The Conciliation Division of the Department of Labor: The
arbitration acts, the federal equity power and the efforts of
the president have opened up to federal intervention practically
all of the labor fields in which the national interest is paramount.
Through the conciliation division of the Department of Labor
85This brief discussion of the 1919 mine strike is based on accounts in
the New York Times.86New York Times and general periodical accounts.
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the government is endeavoring to reach those other disputes
which, while not strictly of national interest, are detrimental to
industrial peace. By the act of 1913 establishing his department 7
the secretary of labor is instructed to act as mediator and to
appoint commissioners of conciliation whenever the interests of
industrial peace require it.85 These federal officers may intervene
in every serious labor dispute in the country. They may, how-
ever, do no more than attempt to bring the two contending parties
together to work out the solution of their own problems."" The
constitutional basis of this power was explained by Representative
Wilson in the House. He declared that if compulsion were
present the power would be in the states but said:
"In fact (the bill) only gives (the secretary) the power to act
in a friendly way to bring the parties together, and I know of
nothing in the constitution that would prevent any officer of the
government from using his friendly offices toward bringing con-'
tending parties together in that way." 9
The success of this method can be seen from the increasing
number of disputes which have been settled by the federal
mediators.91 During the first year 28 cases were successfully
adjusted; in 1915, 42 cases were dealt with; in 1916, 227; in
1917, 378; in 1918, 1,217,2 and in 1919, 1,780. In 1920 the
number fell to 802.93 The wide distribution of these disputes
is indicated in the annual report of the secretary of labor for 1917
who says:
"The cases embraced controversies .. . in 43 states together
with Alaska and Porto Rico and "comprised questions affecting
establishments of nearly every commercial and industrial classifica-
tion." 9
4
The conciliation division of the Department of Labor has
done perhaps more in the interests of true industrial peace than
any other agency of federal intervention. It has given collective
8737 Stat. at L. 736-38.
837 Stat. at L. 738; sec. 8.
$ls t is interesting to note that the conciliation division has itself estab-
lished the policy of refusing to intervene in disputes "so long as any suc-
cessful termination of the case -(is) being worked out by the employer and
his employees." 1920 report of the Department of Labor, 80.9oCong. Rec. 62nd Congress, second session, p. 8851.91The following figures are based on the reports of the secretary of
labor for the years 1913-1920.92The sudden increase in the" number of disputes mediated in this year
was a result of the war. Both labor and capital showed a desire to settle
all disputes peacefully during the the war period.93The drop in 1920 is due to the return of peace and the reaction which
set in upon both labor and capital.
941917 report of the Department of Labor, p. 52.
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bargaining an impetus which far exceeds the impetus given by
arbitration or by presidential intervention,9 5 and has educated
labor and capital in the merits of conciliation as no other method
has done." The weakness of -this mode of intervention, like the
weakness of presidential intervention, lies in the lack of any
power in the mediators either to compel iabor and capital to come
together, or to agree to a peaceful settlement.17  Because of this
inherent weakness it is clearly evident that the mediation of the
department of labor can in no sense be regarded as a reliable
method of settling rail and mine disputes.
The number of disputes actually settled by this method, how-
ever, far exceed those which are not,98 and employers show in-
creasing willingness to submit to mediation. The ability of the
division of conciliation each year to keep the peace in a large
number of industries, and its great service in stimulating collective
bargaining, offsets its lack of power to enforce its awards, to a
modified extent, and warrants the further development of this
mode of mediation in a scheme of federal intervention in labor
disputes.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that neither in the
injunction nor in the mediation, either of the president or of the
secretary of labor, does the public find any absolute guaranty of
freedom from a nation-wide rail or mine strike. As industrial dis-
95 This assertion will be readily acceded to when it is poihted out that
during the entire period from 1913 until 1919 mediation and arbitration
were resorted to under the Newland Act only 91 times, whereas in the
same period mediation and conciliation functioned 3,762 times. Personal in-
tervention by the president has also been used very sparingly.9 GThe rapid growth in the number of disputes in which mediation is
asked illustrates that the education is achieving results. The fact that in
recent years strikes are in progress in only 30 per cent of the cases when
the mediators are summoned, whereas early in the history of the division's
work strikes were usually in progress in more than 70 per cent of the
disputes before the mediators were summoned, also illustrates the point
that capital and labor are being educated in the merits of mediation and
conciliation.
7rA minor weakness lies in the fact that capital regards the Department
of Labor as a body especially favorable and sympathetic to labor and
hence is hesitating in submitting the determination of its rights to a body
which it regards as partisan.
98The following table shows the relationship between the number of
cases settled and those in which no agreement could be arrived at:
Year Cases Successfully Settled Not Adjusted
1913-14 .................. 33 5
1915 ..................... 42 10
1916 ..................... 227 22
1917 ..................... 248 47
1918 ..................... 1,217 71
1919 ..................... 1,80 111
1920 ..................... 802 96
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turbances in the transportation and mining fields increase in fre-
quency and in seriousness, the public demand for an effective
method of strike prevention, is becoming increasingly insistent.
The recent phases of the railroad and mine strike problem, and
the steps that are being taken to make strikes in these fields less
frequent, will be discussed in the following chapter.
(To be concluded.)
